EU citizenship: a slipping anchor to hold on to rights? Brexit and the consequences for EU citizens with British nationality

This summer many European citizens woke up in shock. Whilst reading the newspaper, listening to the radio, scrolling on Facebook, having breakfast, we learnt that a small majority of the voters in the Brexit referendum voted to leave the European Union. Not only does the (potential) Brexit have consequences for the internal market and the economic and social rights of EU citizens, but it also threatens their status as such. This is shocking for EU citizens with the nationality of another Member State residing in the United Kingdom, because their status will be redefined. For instance, in the future they will no longer be able to rely on equal treatment based on EU citizenship in the United Kingdom. Possibly even more shocked were British nationals, who might now actually lose their status as EU citizens, either living in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the European Union. This will significantly impact their possibilities to work, study, and take up residence in another EU Member State.

In this blog-post I will discuss the role of EU citizenship in the Brexit, focusing on whether EU citizenship could be used as an anchor for British nationals to stay within the European Union – at least as citizens.

The current Article 20(1) TFEU provides: ‘Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’ Therefore, the fact that a Member State ceases being an EU Member State consequently means that the nationals belonging to that State are no longer EU citizens, and may lose their rights as EU citizens to free movement, amongst others.

Since the Treaty of Lisbon there is a possibility for Member States to withdraw from the European Union. Paragraph 1 of Article 50 TEU reads ‘Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’. In order to activate this Article, the withdrawing Member State must notify the European Council. After notification a process of negotiation commences in order to conclude an agreement, which is adopted by the Council with the consent of the European Parliament. If after two years of negotiation there is no agreement between the withdrawing State and the EU, the Treaties will simply cease to apply to the Member State at issue. At the time of writing the United Kingdom has not yet notified the European Council to start the Article 50 procedure. However, the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announced that she will start procedures to withdraw from the European Union, and the UK’s Parliament is involved in the procedure, so such a notification is to be expected (soon). Until then, the United Kingdom remains a full Member State of the European Union and its nationals remain EU citizens.

In this context, Article 20 TFEU and Article 50 TEU collide. On the one hand the Treaty grants EU citizens a citizenship status, but on the other hand it seems that Article 50 TEU undermines (or could undermine) the EU citizenship status and the rights that come with that status.

Invoking EU citizenship to challenge the loss of rights by Brexit?

As observed, if and when the United Kingdom withdraws its EU membership, British nationals who do not hold the nationality of another Member State would no longer qualify as EU citizens. Consequently, their rights derived from that status would also be lost. Could it be argued that, based on Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano, a Brexit would result in the deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights of EU citizens, thereby possibly affecting – or even blocking – the withdrawal from the EU, made possible by Article 50 TEU?

In the Rottmann case the Court of Justice of the EU explicitly ruled that the loss of nationality due to national legislation falls within the scope of EU law and that Member States should respect the principle of proportionality if they revoke the nationality of one of their nationals. The case concerned Mr Rottmann, who acquired German nationality due to naturalisation by the German authorities. When he acquired German nationality he also lost his Austrian nationality. When the German authorities discovered that Rottmann had hidden information (that he was subject to criminal investigation in Austria) during his application for German nationality, they withdrew his newly acquired German nationality. The Court of Justice of the EU emphasised that the Member States are competent to regulate nationality rules, but that it is clear that ‘the situation of a citizen of the Union who […] is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalization, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC [Article 20 TFEU] and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law’ (para. 42). In the case of Ruiz Zambrano the Court of Justice of the EU added that the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’ of EU citizens may not be removed by a measure of a Member State (para. 42).  Since EU citizenship is based on the nationality of Member States it is valid and interesting to question whether one could argue that a Brexit would be disproportionate in light of EU citizenship. A Brexit would clearly lead to a situation that falls within the scope of EU law, based on Rottmann, and in which citizens are deprived of their genuine enjoyment of their rights as EU citizens.

However, in my view there are several reasons why the case of Rottmann might not be helpful for those British nationals who want to rely on their EU citizenship in order to keep that status.

First, there is a fundamental difference between Rottmann-like situations and Brexit: in Rottmann the German nationality was withdrawn by the German authorities by an individual decision, affecting one EU citizen. In the Brexit-context the (potential) loss of EU citizenship shall derive from a decision made by the government after a democratic referendum was held. Should individuals be able to challenge the outcome of such a referendum by relying on their EU citizenship rights? If that would be the case a democratic decision would be undermined. That would also run counter to the wording and system of Article 50 TEU, which refers to national constitutional requirements. Moreover, in Rottmann there was the serious threat that Mr. Rottmann would become stateless, which is not the case for British nationals.[2] There are therefore many significant differences between Rottmann and a Brexit situation.

Second, another reason not to be too optimistic for the application of Rottmann to Brexit is more formal, based on Article 50 TEU. Article 50 TEU was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon to create a possibility to withdraw from the European Union. If the Court of Justice of the EU would rule that British nationals could invoke Rottmann to challenge losing their status as EU citizens, the Court of Justice would erode the purpose of Article 50 TEU.[3]

A third reason is that even if one could argue that Rottmann is applicable to the Brexit situation, it is important to bear in mind that in Rottmann the Court of Justice held that the withdrawal of nationality (including the status of EU citizenship) should be proportionate. It did not rule that withdrawal of nationality is principally prohibited by EU law. In that sense, it also seems highly questionable whether a Brexit would not be proportional, since the process was started by a referendum and was introduced by the Prime Minister, and, most importantly a Brexit is a decision taken by a democratic state.

Hence, even though it might be very disappointing, it will be hard to rely on EU citizenship as an anchor to hold on to rights enjoyed as an EU citizen.

Associated citizenship of the European Union

Are there alternatives to EU citizenship? In the United Kingdom the concept of associated citizenship of the European Union was discussed in the aftermath of the Brexit-referendum. Associated EU citizenship would entail a form of citizenship ‘for those who feel and wish to be part of the European project but are nationals of a former Member State’. It would offer ‘these associated citizens the rights of freedom of movement and to reside on its territory as well as being represented in the Parliament through a vote in the European elections on the European lists.’[4] Probably this proposal will not succeed to lead to another form of citizenship for British nationals, for various reasons. One important reason would be, in my view, that associated citizenship would (probably) lead to a status for those with sufficient means and possibilities to actually exercise their free movement rights. Still a small percentage of EU citizens actually migrates to other Member States (more permanently), which would make associate citizenship an ‘European elite status’. Such inequality would run against the absolute core of citizenship: equality. Another consideration is that in terms of the division of powers and the system of Article 50 TEU it is first of all up to the United Kingdom to negotiate on a new status for its citizens. It would therefore be not very appropriate, perhaps, if the solution came from the European Union, now that the United Kingdom wants to withdraw. Moreover, on a more procedural level, such associated citizenship would require a Treaty revision, which implies the consent of all Member States. It is not very likely that such a Treaty revision would garner unanimous support.

The way forward: destination unknown

It therefore seems that EU citizenship will not solve a Brexit for those who want to remain in the European Union as EU citizens. At the same time, as Davies argues, if EU citizenship can be revoked for a whole population by 51% of the voters, then how fundamental is EU citizenship? Davies states: ‘if we accept that Union citizenship can be removed by a national parliamentary majority of 51% then we implicitly regard that citizenship as a contingent status of convenience, a discount card in the supermarket that is Europe, rather than a corollary of supranational belonging.’ How does Article 50 TEU relate to Article 20 TFEU? Should Article 50 TEU not be read in the light of EU citizenship? Does EU citizenship become an additional status that can be revoked even if many want to keep their rights as an EU citizen? In that sense it is now even more important than ever to define (or redefine) the narrative of EU citizenship and its future.

Brexit poses various difficult questions in the context of EU citizenship: how to deal with the acquired rights of EU citizens residing in the UK? What will happen to the rights of British nationals in other Member States? Are they suddenly regarded as third country nationals? What consequences would that have? Many of these questions will have to be answered in the process of negotiations between the EU and the United Kingdom, as pointed out in more detail by Coutts. However, another urgent and fundamental question is, in my view: how do we want to value EU citizenship in a changing European Union, taking into account different developments on EU as well as on national level(s)? Is it time to redefine EU citizenship as a fundamental status or should we agree that EU citizenship becomes less constitutional, less supranational in concept? Or should we reinforce the underlying values of EU citizenship and what are those? EU citizenship seems to be more contested than ever, nowadays. A slipping anchor. Are we drifting away or can we try to secure what is often called the destined ‘fundamental status’ of nationals of the European Union?

[1] This blog is based on a larger contribution by Hanneke van Eijken and Pauline Phoa that will appear in the BEUCitizen book: ‘Civil Rights and the Coming of Age of EU Citizenship – Challenges at the Crossroads of the European, the National and the Private Sphere.’ Edward Elgar (forthcoming in 2017). See also the BEU Citizen report on core citizenship rights.

[2] P. L. Athanassiou and S. Laulhé Shaelou, EU Citizenship and its relevance for EU exit and secession, in: D. Kochenov (ed.), EU citizenship and federalism (Cambridge University Press), forthcoming.

[3]  See on this point also Gareth Davies, Union citizenship – still Europeans’ destiny after brexit?, Europa Law Blog, July 2016, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/07/07/union-citizenship-still-europeans-destiny-after-brexit/.

[4] See the proposal for a regulation, Amendment 882 by MEP Charles Goerens.

Verkiezingen 2017: staat de aanbesteding op de kaart?


Door Willem Janssen & Laura de Vries      

Op 15 maart 2017 gaat Nederland naar de stembus. Het beloven interessante Tweede Kamerverkiezingen te worden. De economie, werkgelegenheid, immigratie en EU zullen daarin waarschijnlijk een belangrijke rol gaan spelen. Dit blijkt ook uit de – veelal erg lijvige – verkiezingsprogramma’s van politieke partijen. Ook aanbestedingen komen daarin met regelmaat terug. In deze bijdrage geven wij een overzicht van de standpunten en voorstellen met betrekking tot aanbestedingen. Wij beperken ons tot de verkiezingsprogramma’s van partijen die in de recentelijke peiling van Ipsos het grootste waren (50plus, CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, VVD).

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Rem tegen EU-bevoegdheidsoverdracht: drie bezwaren tegen het SGP-plan

Copyright: Tristan Sprarks

De SGP wil de EU beter in de teugels houden. Daarom vindt de partij dat belangrijke wijzigingen van de EU-verdragen in het vervolg alleen met een 2/3 meerderheid in beide kamers van onze Staten-Generaal aangenomen kunnen worden. Het gaat de SGP vooral om verdragen waarin nieuwe bevoegdheden aan de EU worden overgedragen (maar bijvoorbeeld ook de toetreding van nieuwe lidstaten). Of het nodig is om de EU meer in de teugels te houden is vooral een politieke vraag. Echter, ook – en zelfs: juist – als het antwoord op die vraag “ja” is, dan is het plan van de SGP om drie redenen een slecht idee. Lees verder

The Polisario Front Judgment of the EU Court of Justice: a Reset of EU-Morocco Trade Relations in the Offing

Credit: Katarina Dzurekova (CC BY)

On 21 December 2016, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) gave its appeals judgment in the politically contentious Polisario Front case. The Court overruled an earlier decision of the General Court (GC, 2015) and decided that the EU-Morocco trade agreement does not apply to the territory of Western Sahara, which is claimed by Morocco as its own (see Sandra Hummelbrunner and Anne-Carlijn Prickartz’s analysis). The Court then went on to dismiss the action for annulment brought against the EU Council decision endorsing the agreement by the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement representing the Saharawi population indigenous to Western Sahara. In so doing, the Court largely followed Advocate General Wathelet’s advisory opinion, at least its first part (see on this Katharine Fortin’s analysis over at the UCall blog). The dismissal of the Polisario Front’s action may appear to be a victory for the EU Council and Morocco. However, in a manner reminiscent of Pyrrhus’s battles with the Romans in the 3rd century BC, it may well turn out to be a loss, and in fact a boon for the Saharawi. Although the CJEU held that the Front did not have standing to dispute the EU Council decision, this determination precisely followed from the Court’s recognition of the people of Western Sahara’s right to self-determination and the attendant exclusion of the territory from the trade agreement. Henceforth, the EU Council and Morocco have no other choice than to exclude products from Western Sahara from their trade agreements. Lees verder

How Failing Aggregates Brought About a Landmark Decision of the CJEU

by Kilian Klinger & Linda Senden

by tablexxnx

The Court’s recent ruling in the Elliott case can be seen as a landmark decision as it was the first time the Court had to decide upon the normative value of European harmonised technical standards (HTSs). This took its starting point in the mere question brought before the Court, whether or not such acts, adopted by private European standardisation bodies (ESBs), are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on their interpretation pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU. Before substantiating on the central argumentative underpinnings of the Court’s judgment, let us first briefly summarize the facts of the case. Lees verder

Leren van het Verenigd Koninkrijk in Brexit-tijden: naar een Nederlandse Wet op de EU?

Copyright: Tristan Sprarks

De Brexit is een ingewikkelder traject gebleken dan wellicht vooraf voorzien. Kink in de kabel voor de Britse regering is de recente beslissing van de High Court. Dit rechterlijk college besliste dat de regering toestemming nodig heeft van het Britse parlement voor de melding van haar voornemen om uit de EU te stappen. Het nationale recht gaf de doorslag voor die beslissing. Het ging immers primair om de verhouding tussen de uitvoerende macht, de regering, en het parlement. Lees verder

Brexit and ‘mexit’? The legal dimension of the EU Single Market and Brexit

brexit-doorA few weeks ago the High Court ruled in favour of the role of the UK Parliament in the process of triggering Article 50 TEU. Some newspapers reacted with fury, like the Daily Mail branding the judges as the ‘Enemies of the People’. These reactions constitute an unprecedented attack on the independence of the judiciary, which according to MPs and other commentators undermines the rule of law. These are the latest developments in a series of tumultuous events surrounding the Brexit decision, which have important ramifications for the EU and for the UK. Lees verder

Exciting times for the EU implementation of RENFORCE efforts for the future proof protection of minors online

Coming from the Molengraaff Institute of Private law (REBO), I feel very much connected to RENFORCE and its work. From my early days as a PHD student, my focus has been on how regulation and supervision can deal with disruptive technology in a future proof way. How to support innovation on the one hand and to protect vulnerable consumer interests on the other, has been the leading theme in my work both in academia and for society. Since this is one of the key themes of RENFORCE, I always feel very much at home, but the last six month have been extremely exciting existing in this respect.tumblr_o1ioscgle31tr7a3bo1_500

With and trough RENFORCE we have initiated many very valuable projects.  One of these initiatives is the project on the EU regulation of the protection of minors on all platforms and media against harmful, violent content. What is the optimal regulatory mix to guarantee protection of our beloved children on the one hand, whilst avoiding stifling innovation of the promising converging media on the other? A RENFORCE Conference on the topic as well as a peer reviewed publication formed the basis of my input in the recent update of the Directive on audio-visual media services, input I could give both as a RENFORCE law professor and as an ERGA chair[1]. I was extremely grateful to learn that the academic effort was fully acknowledge by the European Commission in its text for a New Directive for Audio-visual media services. A perfect valorisation of RENFORCEs academic efforts.

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Ripples from across the pond: Extraterritorial Effects of the Microsoft Ireland Case

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One of the big internet cases of this year, the Microsoft Ireland case, has come to an end about a month ago as the 2nd Circuit Court has handed down its ruling in favour of Microsoft. The case made quite a splash and has been covered  before at the RENFORCE blog. With the verdict in, the time is ripe to revisit it and look at it again, this time from a different angle. Lees verder

Amerikaans Hooggerechtshof verklaart EU en haar lidstaten niet ontvankelijk in grote witwaszaak

supreme-court-building-1209701_1920In de jaren ’90 smokkelden Colombiaanse en Russische trafficanten drugs naar Europa. Met de opbrengst kochten ze via tussenpersonen grote hoeveelheden sigaretten van het Amerikaanse bedrijf RJR Nabisco. Ze importeerden die vervolgens in Europa. Je zou verwachten dat de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten RJR voor dit witwassen van criminele opbrengsten in Europa zouden vervolgen. Begin 2000 stond het Europees strafrecht echter in zijn kinderschoenen. Centrale afdwinging bestond niet en de coördinatie van strafvervolgingen in Europa liet ernstig te wensen over. Om toch tot een vorm van centrale vervolging van RJR te komen vonden de EU (de Europese Gemeenschap indertijd) en haar lidstaten er niets beters op dan in 2000 als eisers op te treden in een procedure in de Verenigde Staten op basis van de RICO Act (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). Die wet was in 1970 aangenomen om de maffia aan te pakken. Hij geeft niet enkel een mandaat aan Amerikaanse autoriteiten om een strafprocedure tegen ‘racketeers’ zoals RJR te starten, maar staat slachtoffers van de activiteiten van racketeers ook toe een civiele claim in te dienen bij Amerikaanse rechtbanken. Een dergelijke procedure is overigens erg aantrekkelijk, aangezien de eiser een drievoudige ‘punitieve’ schadevergoeding kan verkrijgen (treble damages). De EU en haar lidstaten voerden aan dat zij schade hadden geleden door de activiteiten van RJR, met name zouden hun nationale sigarettenindustrieën en de Europese financiële instellingen benadeeld zijn, zouden belastinginkomsten misgelopen zijn door zwarte-marktverkoop van sigaretten, en zouden Europese munten instabiel geworden zijn. Lees verder