By Lisette Mustert, Béla Strauss, Miroslava Scholten and Matthew Wood
Brexit raises the question of which way forward for the UK in its relationship with the EU and with EU agencies. For future research and legislative design, this in turn raises a more fundamental question of when which type of agreement between a third country and EU agencies is appropriate, in light of factors such as salience and the interests on both sides. Having analysed all EU agencies’ founding acts, we show in this post that there are three types of formal relationships that exist at this moment between EU agencies and other countries: full membership, observership and cooperation. We argue that the type of this relationship would vary for the UK depending on the score of ‘Brexit salience’, a concept that we introduce. The higher the ‘Brexit salience’ rating is, the more formal the arrangement – full membership or observer – the UK (and the EU) would need to have with an EU agency. According to our scores, this would concern the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). In the case of EU agencies that score low on our salience rating, the UK (and the EU) would want to opt for a relatively limited form of cooperation with EU agencies. This would be the case for Cepol, EIGE, ACER, Frontex and CPVO. Surprisingly, the seemingly highly salient agency in the public debate – the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (also known as Frontex) – scores the joint lowest rating. How is this possible, when for the UK immigration is so important during the Brexit vote? It is because, first, our Brexit salience measures do not focus on what is salient in general for the British or European public. Rather, we are concerned with practical matters of policy implementation. As a matter of policy, Frontex has a clear and well-resourced opposite agency – the UK Border Agency – and its operation does not affect a discrete and well-defined policy area.
EU agencies’ number and powers have grown tremendously in the recent years. Despite the so-called Meroni ‘non-delegation’ doctrine, EU agencies perform a wide range of tasks. They can contribute to or pass (soft) rules of general applications and impose sanctions for violation of EU laws vis-à-vis private actors (Scholten and Luchtman 2017). The increase of powers and hence impact of EU agencies on society raises the urge for legitimising these institutions. One of the major ways to legitimize institutions is establishing proper governance structures and ensuring suitable top-level officials who manage agencies and bare responsibility for agencies’ performance. In this blog post, we offer a comprehensive evaluation of EU agency directors’ functions and appointment procedures and requirements. We show that the appointed directors fit the profiles of EU agencies that they head well, nevertheless we quest the necessity of the existing excessive variety of appointment procedures (12!), which in our view hinders legitimacy. Continue reading
Twenty years ago, Alexander Kreher wrote one of the first articles on EU agencies arguing for the growing importance of this ‘institutional phenomenon’, which was almost completely ignored within the academic literature of that time. Judging from the countless number of academic articles and the tremendous growth of the cumulative budget (via-s-via the Commission, see Figure 1), it seems that the importance of EU agencies has only grown. The development in researching and governing EU Agencies has gone from gathering the somewhat scattered creations of agencies in different policy areas, under different treaty provisions, with different powers and for different purposes, etc. to bringing them under one ‘EU agencies’ umbrella as part of the EU executive machinery distinct from the EU Commission. Indeed, EU agencies have been treated as an ensemble for the budgetary purposes, also at the European Parliament, where the practice of three agencies’ directors would defend budgetary proposals on behalf of all ‘EU agencies’. We have seen the creation of the ‘Common Approach’ and later a roadmap with a view of streamlining the creation and revision of the founding acts of EU agencies. Furthermore, EU agencies’ directors have organized themselves in a network of agencies’ directors to discuss common challenges. To what extent, however, should we treat them as one? Continue reading
Source: Lex van Lieshout
On 11 May 2016, the European Parliament adopted a new regulation for Europol, which will enter into force on 1 May 2017. This Regulation establishes the – so far unprecedented political accountability mechanism in the EU – Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny. The introduction of a mechanism, which links political accountability fora of the EU and the national levels, is a revolutionary development for the evolving multi-level accountability system (of EU agencies). To enhance democratic legitimacy of the EU structures and decisions, the legislative and accountability roles of the European Parliament have grown significantly in the last decennia (Scholten 2014). Yet, never before did national parliaments become involved in holding EU entities to account, too. Continue reading